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ABSTRACT 
After Soeharto’s fall in 1998, a plethora of different types of media discovered ways to grow 
and expand in Indonesia. After Indonesia accepted the democratic political system, freedom 
of expression became part of everyday life. As pillars of democracy, the media are the tools 
par excellence for the expression of the people’s ideas. Established in 2007, Rodja TV 
started its own discourse amidst civil society. The aim of this paper is to see the 
involvement of Rodja TV in the civil society discourse for community development. To what 
extent Rodja TV’s discourse has involved the four civil society spheres - private, public, 
market, and the state - and how it pursued the creation of the exemplified community it 
promotes. This paper takes the qualitative approach and uses data gathered from 
observation, documents, and interviews. Apparently, Rodja TV has adopted a safe discourse 
by showing its propensity for mainstream Sunni Islam rather than taking the jihadi approach 
to politics that strives for the establishment of an Islamic state. Rodja TV’s main targets are 
localism and globalism but it is open to local values and selected expressions of modernism. 
However, it does not criticise the Indonesian government in fighting terrorism. While the 
station initially targeted a limited audience, because it broadcasts information about Islamic 
tenets, its public audience widened and members of Muslim associations, businessmen, and 
members of the government have become attracted to Rodja TV’s programs.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Following Soeharto’s fall and as the 1998 reform era started, a wide range of 
different media mushroomed in Indonesia. According to the Dewan Pers (Indonesian 
Press Council), over the last 17 years, the number of radio and television stations has 
increased from one national television and one radio station in 1997, to 1165 and 
398 respectively in 2014. Moreover, in the same period, the number of social media 
users reached a staggering 132.7 million people, out of a population of over 250 
million in Indonesia (APJI, 2016). 
In present-day Indonesia, the availability of Islamic media is not exceptional; 
in fact, their number has increased significantly. In addition, streaming now makes it 
increasingly easier to set up television stations and to make their operations 
affordable.  
As the country is home to a multitude of communities, community radios and 
television stations have sprung up to serve religious communities, tribes, and social 
and ethnic groups. Some groups are seen as reformist-radical and run against 
Indonesian religious practices while others are critical of the government and 
believed to be un-Islamic (Saether, 2013). Some stations are tolerant towards the 
government and have adapted their strategy in order to survive undisturbed. 
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This paper examines Rodja TV’s discourse in civil society with respect to the 
private, public, market spheres and the State, and analyses how it adapted its 
strategy and argumentation vis-à-vis these spheres. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
On the Concept of Civil Society  
According to Cohen and Arato (1992, p. 29-82), civil society is not a major concept in 
the social sciences and it only became popular in Indonesia in the 1990’s. Social science 
literature has documented at least four meanings of the term. It was first introduced in 
the 19th century by Hegel and Karl Marx (1976 [1846]) who emphasized that civil 
society was a non-state sphere of influence and in particular encompassed capitalism, 
industrialization, and individualism. In their theory, civil society refers to the role of 
the bourgeoisie and thus to spheres other than those of the family and the state. 
Hegel and Marx do not — as usual among social scientists— differentiate between the 
various groups and networks that make up this sphere. 
The second meaning was put forward by Antonio Gramsci (1971), among 
others, who interprets the state’s behaviour by both judging it in relation to 
citizenship and by determining whether the state develops an effective civil 
mechanism or organization that prevents individuals or a group from becoming 
tyrannical, victimizing, and abusive in its actions or treatments, and reprimands these 
individuals or groups when they engage in such actions. For Gramsci, business 
corporations are at the core of civil society, in addition to industrialization and 
individualism. The state and public spheres overlap and merge to such an extent that 
it is difficult to tell where one ends and the other starts. According to Gramsci, it is 
crucial to understand the mutually reinforcing relationship the two are engaged in. He 
adopts a normative approach and mainly adopts a negative perspective, for example 
in elucidating the behaviour of communists and the outcomes of their behaviour. No 
effort is made to identify the comparative strengths and weaknesses of dominant and 
peripheral groups. In short, no comparative theory has been proposed (see, for 
example Taylor, 1990; Seligman, 1992; Gellner, 1994; and Radcliff, 2011, among others). 
The third meaning of the concept of civil society is proposed in the works of 
Lipset (1981), Habermas (1989), and Chambré and Goldnes (Eds., 2008), Gabay 
(2013), Sales (1991), and others, who stress the interaction between voluntary 
groups and the market, public, and private spheres. This third meaning, 
emphasizing non-governmental organizations vis-à-vis all spheres other than the 
state, is common to all social sciences. Cohen and Arato (1992, p.421-491), Baker 
(2005), Sasaki (2015), Baiocchi, Heler and Silva (2011), however, add a fourth 
meaning to the concept and are unique in their clear classification of society into four 
spheres — private, public, market, and state – where each sphere has the same weight 
and the same power to establish checks and balances for a true civil society at the 
country level, as believed by Thomas Janoski (1998, p.12). No civil society can exist 
without the involvement of the state. The present paper adopts this last meaning. 
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Civil Society in Indonesian Islam 
In Indonesia, scholars who study civil society are divided into five categories (see 
Baso, 1999). According to Baso, one group is predominantly supported by members 
of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), a Muslim association established in 1926. It is 
identified as a traditionalist group that accommodates local values and wisdoms, 
with a rural-based approach to social development and beliefs (Bakti, 2002b & c). This 
group translates "civil society" into Indonesian as masyarakat sipil (see Hikam, 1996; 
Baso, 1999). The second group mainly comprises of members of the ICMI (All-
Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals’ Association), established by B.J. Habibie (who later 
became the third president of Indonesia who ruled from 1998 to 2000), and members of 
the Muhammadiyah, a modernist Muslim association established in 1912 that accepts 
science and technology (Bakti, 2002b) as well as the belief that the Prophet 
Muhammad’s city of Medina in the seventh century was modern beyond its time. This 
group translates civil society as masyarakat madani, meaning the Madina community 
(see Madjid, 1996; Rahardjo, 1999; TNRMMM, 1999, among others) and sees it as 
the "main society" (masyarakat utama). Schumann (1999) also adopted the term 
masyarakat madani. However, some scholars making up a third group in Indonesia 
prefer to use the English term "civil society" (Mahfud, 2002; Prasetyo and Munhanif, 
2002, among others) as they are influenced by Western scholars. The fourth category 
uses the less often used translation of masyarakat tamaddun (Sufyanto, 2001), ‘civilized 
society’. In their criticism of Madjid’s approach to the concept, NU scholars appear to 
accept the argument presented by "post-modernists" and "hermeneutic theorists" 
(see Sufyanto, 2001). The last category refers to Ibn Khaldun’s 14th century term 
haḍara (civilization) as opposed to badawa (desert nomads). 
Nevertheless, the term most commonly used in the Malay World today is 
masyarakat madani (see Ibrahim, 1996; Madjid, 1996), which, for some scholars, has a 
more normative meaning than either "civil society", masyarakat sipil, or masyarakat 
tamaddun.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
On Umma, Da‘wa and Salafi 
Using discourse analysis, the conceptual methodology put forward in this paper analyses 
Rodja TV from the perspective of the umma in three different ways:  
First, umma is treated as an ideal country, using Ferdinand de Tonnïes’ terms (1964) 
as either society (patembayan) or community (paguyuban). This is analysed in this paper by 
using Janoski’s (1998) four spheres of civil society: the state, market, public, and private 
spheres. 
 Second, umma is a secular civil society organization in the sense of a voluntary 
group, which is more general in its orientation and uses three approaches to communication 
with respect to society development. The focus is basically on the public sphere, as in the 
case of Rodja TV, vis-à-vis the three other spheres: state, market, and private. In Qur’anic 
terms, this is called: takwin al-umma (society development), that includes: yad‘una ila al-
khayr (promoting doing good deeds), ya’muruna bi al-ma‘ruf (commanding local wisdoms), 
and yanhawna ‘an al-munkar (prohibiting corrupted values and non-productive local 
wisdom). The orientation of this kind of society development is secular, an approach it 
shares with developed countries including the West.  
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Third, the umma is seen as a religious civil society organization, based on voluntary 
association, which is religious in orientation but yet constitutes an open community through 
four approaches to communication. It is particularly concerned with community 
development. The Qur’anic term khayriyyat al-umma (exemplified community) includes: 
ukhrijat li al-nas (human orientation, outward looking), ta’muruna bi al-ma‘ruf 
(commanding local wisdom), tanhawna ‘an al-munkar (prohibiting corruption), and 
tu’minuna bi Allah (believing in God). In Islam, the ultimate goal of this kind of civil society 
organization is the establishment of an ideal civil community (masyarakat madani), a Malay-
Indonesian model of religious civil society. 
The last concept would seem appropriate for an analysis of Rodja TV’s discourse and 
its programs in Islamic communication in view of the four spheres of civil society mentioned 
above. This paper adopts a bottom up strategy and starts from the private spheres of the 
self, family, and their properties and subsequently moves up to the public spheres (qawm): 
voluntary organizations or groups, or non-governmental organizations, before arriving at 
the market spheres of corporations, businesses, cooperatives, and economic resources. The 
final stage will be the state sphere (sha‘bun/qabila), which includes legislative, judiciary, and 
executive institutions, as well as the military and the police. 
This paper’s analysis adopts the four elements of the ilmu al-da‘wa (Islamic 
communication science) theory. According to Bakti (2013), the first element is tabligh 
(information, messages, tenets, speeches, reminders, and sermons), which thus does not 
include propaganda, mission work, proselytization, and conversion. This element is related 
to oralities and the statements of the senders, the understanding of the receivers, the 
channels used and the effects communication has, as well as the interactivities 
(convergence) of both sender and receiver. The second element, taghyir (social changes) 
covers modernization, the dependency and interdependency of the receivers, and the 
multiplicity approach to social changes between the centre and the periphery, and self-
sufficiency. The third element is that of takwin al-umma (society development), as 
mentioned above, in particular in its relation with technological development that consists 
of the diffusion of innovation, social marketing, participatory development and self-
creativity that is congruent with universal values, local wisdoms, and the banning of corrupt 
ideas that go against human dignity. The last meaning of da‘wa is khayriyyat al-umma 
(exemplified community) for development, which is an exemplified community or society 
based on akhlaq (morality, character, ethics, civic values), that includes the private, public, 
market, and state spheres of civil society, in both the general or in a specific context of a 
civil society organization as a voluntary group.  
This last approach to community development is related to the concepts of nafs 
(self), ahl (family/member), jama‘at al-salafi al-salih (the members of the first three 
generations of Muslims; the reputed exemplary early followers), Sunni (followers of the 
traditions of Prophet Muhammad, as opposed to Shi‘i), Sunna (the Prophet Muhammad’s 
traditions), ahl al-sunna wa al-jama‘a (the people of Muhammad’s traditions and of his 
community), sauq/a’mal/sharika (business/company), and uli al-amr (government). The 
traditions of the early generations of Muslims contrast with heresy (bid‘a), superstitions, 
mythologies, syncretism and their followers (Talibi, 2006). This sunna/salafi group consists 
of three major categories: traditionalists, reformists, and jihadists —the promoters of an 
Islamic state themselves are divided into two groups according to the means they used to 
reach their goal: harmony or aggression (Adraou, 2008). However, Salafists have developed 
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a new meaning for ‘following the salaf’ (al-ittiba' al-salaf), that is to totally accept all 
reputed salaf traditions, sometimes uncritically. This total acceptance indicates that the 
Salafists are strongly committed to community development according to the exemplified 
community model (khayriyyat al-umma).  
The data used in this paper includes material obtained from observations, interviews 
and reviews of documentation from official website (OW), booklets, YouTube videos of 
Rodja TV programs, and literature published and used by Rodja TV from March 2016 to July 
2017. 
 
CASE STUDY OF THIS RESEARCH 
The present case study focuses on Rodja TV as one of the mediums Salafists use for da‘wa in 
Indonesia. This television station, located on Jalan Pahlawan Kampung Tengah, RT. 003, 
Cilewungsi, behind the Cileuengsi police station in Bogor, Indonesia, is experiencing a fairly 
rapid expansion, despite its infancy. According to its OW, the television station has evolved 
from a community FM radio station that started broadcasting in early 2005 (OW, October 
24, 2013). 
Because this community radio generated great public interest, Radio Rodja was 
legalized by the government. Indeed, it previously operated based on an act of the Notary 
Public (No. 4, 2007), awaiting the formal approval of the national Ministry of Information. 
The community radio switched to the 756 kHz (AM) frequency in 2007. Pursuing its strong 
commitment to provide its listeners with the best shows on Islamic information, in 2009, 
Rodja launched Rodja TV to communicate Islamic tenets via internet streaming. In 2011, 
Rodja TV started to broadcast via satellite, enabling viewers to enjoy this station on a 
television set with the help of a parabolic antenna (OW, October 24, 2013). Therefore, it is 
not surprising that people watch Rodja TV shows in rural areas where satellite dishes are 
used. 
Rodja TV is a non-profit television station, with events and programs geared to 
communicating and lecturing on Islam and Islamic activities. Monologues, dialogues, and 
talk shows address the study of aqida (faith), shari‘a (law), akhlaq (morality), and tilawat al-
Qur'an (Qu’anic recitation). The content also indicates that this station provides information 
and messages about Islam in relation to social change and development as well as 
community development by using a flexible schedule, where guest lectures and new 
programs can easily be inserted (OW, December 29, 2014). 
The Cahaya Sunna (the Light of the Sunna) Foundation is actually the umbrella and 
the holding company of all Rodja Islamic programs and activities (Hasanudin, June 20, 2017). 
Indeed, Rodja is owned by this foundation. In addition to Rodja TV, this foundation owns 
educational institutions, such as an elementary Islamic school, a Pondok Pesantren 
(boarding school) Tahfiz al-Qur'an al-Syatibi, Radio Rodja, and shopping outlets (OW, 
December 02, 2015). The foundation also offers social services by collecting zakat 
(almsgiving) and the provision of humanitarian help. 
 
DISCUSSION AND RESULT 
Rodja TV’s Role in Civil Society  
This section analyses Rodja TV as a civil society organization by using four analytical 
viewpoints, namely private, public, market, and state. These spheres will be seen in the 
context of Islamic communication and are relevant to review Rodja TV, as it was set up by 
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the salafi community, a still relatively new movement in Indonesia, whose existence has 
given Islam new dynamics in Indonesia. 
 
a) Private: Founders, Family, and Donated Wealth 
The individuals involved in the establishment of the Cahaya Sunna Foundation from the 
onset are Haji Badrusalam (adviser), Agus Hasanudin (head), Dian Sudiana (secretary), 
Muhammad Iim Muslimin (treasurer), and Nurwan Iskandar (supervisor) (Interview: 
Muslimin, June 20, 2017). While the adviser is a religious teacher, the other four are 
businessmen and opinion leaders. Together, all five initially started with broadcasting 
religious instruction from the Al-Barkah Mosque, a small mosque that could accommodate 
about 100 persons built on a piece of land donated by Hasanudin (Interview: June 20, 2017). 
These individuals decided to establish a community radio, and later a television 
station. Hasanudin was directly involved in both the initial radio and later television stations 
and is the general chairman of the group. Information technology specialists, Abu Fawwaz 
and Abu Fauzan, are among the younger men who took part in its operation (Interview: July 
15, 2016). The main teachers of the station include Haji Badrusalam, Abdul Hakim Abdat, 
Abdul Qadir Jawas and Firanda Andirja (Interview: July 20, 2016). Via Fawwaz and Fauzan, 
police officers from the Jakarta Police Station like Mujiarto Karuk volunteer to help the 
station and they provide it with unofficial protection (Interview: July 21, 2016). Indeed, the 
cooperation between all the above individuals reveals their complementary strengths, 
including the fact that they have become aware of how important it is to operate a station 
delivering da‘wa messages. The individuals mentioned above together established Radio 
Rodja and Rodja TV using the relatively small initial private capital of IDR 3.5 million.  
According to Hasanudin, when Radio Rodja was first set up, technicians recruited 
from the listeners to the radio station assembled the required transmission equipment. 
Individual creativity was needed. For that purpose, one room in the Al-Barkah Mosque was 
turned into a studio and the broadcast range was a mere 5-kilometer radius. In 2007, a 
nearby naval radio station, aired on a wider-ranged frequency channel, unintentionally 
interfered with Radio Rodja’s broadcasts. As the Islamic shows alternated with a Navy music 
program (such as dangdut and other popular songs and instrumental music), Radio Rodja’s 
audience protested but to no avail because the Navy radio used a larger frequency. 
Eventually, about 40 Radio Rodja listeners took the initiative to gather at the Al-Barkah 
Mosque in order to solve this problem internally and to protect the station from further 
intrusion by increasing the frequency of Radio Rodja broadcasts from 107.9 FM to 756 AM, 
using their own devices with the help of a start-up capital of 90 million Rupiah (Interview: 
Hasanudin, June 20, 2017). 
Then the foundation established Rodja TV, in addition to Radio Rodja. Badrusalam, 
one of the founders who took the initiative to create both Radio Rodja and Rodja TV, takes 
part in the broadcasts as a preacher, as do two other preachers, Nurul Dzikri and Erwandi 
Tarmidzi (December 10, 2016). They talk about Salafism and related issues including family, 
social, economic, and community development. Andirja also currently delivers lectures and 
he preaches on Rodja TV. He is from the Nabawi Mosque (the Prophet’s mosque) in Madina, 
Saudi Arabia. Two well-known senior Rodja TV preachers, Amir Abdat and Qadir Jawas, are 
both alumni of LIPIA (the Saudi Arabia Islamic Science Institute), in Jakarta. Because it 
employs these preachers, Rodja TV has been supported by Saudi individuals and 
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businessmen as well as ulamas and shaykhs from all over the world (Interview, Fawwaz, 
December 12, 2016). 
 
b) Public: Rodja TV Salafis as Traditionalist Muslims 
Rodja TV is one of the Islamic television stations that is growing in the midst of secular 
media. Two terms are used for this type of media. One is Islamic TV and Khaled Hroub 
(2012) used it for ‘religious broadcasting’. The second is ‘religious television’ and is used by 
Peter Horsfile (1984). As an Islamic media, Rodja TV has distinctive features that distinguish 
it from secular media. Among the most prominent features are the Salafi programs that it 
airs.  
Its leaders structured Rodja TV into a medium committed to the Qur’an and the 
Sunna. Its strength lies in the messages it broadcasts from both sources as well as in the 
solidarity of its congregation or community (Interview: Badrussalam, September 2, 2016). 
The reasons why this station stands out are first, Rodja TV programs contain or are related 
to Islamic messages (OW, October 24, 2013). Second, the station persistently broadcasts 
Islamic information in the Salafi perspective. The audience draws on the power of Salafism 
and is at the same time tightly knitted through this station (Interview: Badrusalam, October 
15, 2016). Indeed, if the popularity of this station is seen as an indication of the 
development of Salafism in Indonesia, it is clear that adherence to the Salafi orientation is 
growing steadily. According to Andirja (October 4, 2013; see also Hasan, 2006), as a Salafi 
station, Rodja TV first received assistance to employ human resources from the Ihya al-
Turath al-Islami foundation in Kuwait. Moreover, almost every preacher who is invited to 
the station is from Madina, Saudi Arabia, or is an alumni of LIPIA Jakarta, a branch of the 
Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (OW, August 25, 
2013), the mission of which is to disseminate Salafi messages to other countries. Thus, the 
above open-minded strategy (ukhrijat li al-nas) in spreading Islamic values and tenets is at 
work. 
By totally accepting the Salafi ideology, Rodja TV nurtures a strict vision of Islam and 
does this in particular by emphasizing the prohibition of doing bad deeds (nahy munkar), by 
commanding doing good deeds (amar ma‘ruf) and by believing in God’s Oneness (tawhid, 
imanu billah)). In fact, Rodja TV’s leaders reject any Islamic variant that is incompatible with 
the Qur’an and the Sunna. For them, the true tenets of Islam consist of the content of these 
main sources of Islam and what the Salaf generations practiced (Interview: Ihsan and 
Zainuddin, June 22, 2016). Therefore, it advertises that any new creation (which by nature is 
heresy), any form of religious syncretism, superstition, and innovation must be rejected, as 
in the quote from an often used hadith: Kullu bid‘atin ḍalalah, wakullu ḍalalatin fi al-nar (al-
Nasai, 1999). Speakers observe this strictness when they declare other Islamic groups to be 
heretics and untrue Muslims. 
This strict attitude in Islamic information, social change, and development for civil 
society is also observed in the four Islamic communication goals expressed by this group. 
The first is to restore khayriyyat al-umma, the community’s correct understanding of Islam 
according to the Qur’an and the Sunna based on the understanding of the generations of 
the sāhaba, tabi’in, and tabi‘ al-tabi‘in (salaf al-salih). Secondly, to purify Islamic law from all 
forms of shirk (polytheism), heresy, and deviant thought. Third, to encourage Muslims to 
follow the pure tenets of Islam: to do good deeds, take the right actions, and to give to 
charities (as implementations of amar ma‘ruf) through Rodja TV. Fourth, to revive the da‘wa 
Media and Religion: Rodja TV’s Involvement in the Civil Society Discourse for Community 
Development 
Andi Faisal Bakti  
 
233 
 
E-ISSN: 2289-1528 
https://doi.org/10.17576/JKMJC-2018-3403-13 
 
method based on the Qur’an and Sunna according to the understanding of salaf al-salih 
(Tim Penulis, 2016). 
When Rodja TV was first set up, its rejection of the local values and practices in the 
surrounding community, which it labelled un-Islamic, met with resistance. Indeed, at the 
time, Islamic learning sessions were held at the Al-Barkah Mosque, a community mosque 
which used to follow local Islamic traditions (Interview: Abdullah, September 23, 2016). 
According to Hasanudin (Interview: August 25, 2016), “The Islamic messages that we 
broadcast and our sermons first met with opposition from the surrounding community. But, 
the presence and the persistence of Rodja TV slowly made the surrounding community 
understand and accept our mission.” For him, the messages were effective. 
Although the broadcasts are officially open and accessible to anyone, like all 
television stations, it already has its own jama‘a (community), its own faithful audience. It is 
also not surprising that other mosques, including the Bintaro Al-Sunna Mosque in Banten, 
directly show Rodja TV’s programs to their audiences (OW, December 2, 2017). This 
adhesion is not surprising since a growing number of communities have the feeling that the 
religious practices in their surroundings go against the Qur’an and the Sunna (‘Asy’ari, 
2013).  
Rodja TV’s traditionalist Salafi group differs from the two other traditionalist Salafi 
groups found elsewhere in Indonesia and the rest of the world: reformist-political Salafists 
and jihadist Salafists, including those who adhere to ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) and 
al-Qaidah (Pall, 2013). Salafi traditionalists are apolitical, they discourage rebellion against 
the state, and are not organized as a political organization (Durie, 2013; see also 
Wiktorowicz, 29, 2006: 207-239). They do not constitute a civil movement but represent 
what Van Bruinessen (2003) calls a jama‘a (congregation) and an usra (family), which 
distinguishes them from civil movements like the NU and the Muhammadiyah.  
Rodja TV activities go beyond the Al-Barkah Mosque and the station reaches out to 
preach in other mosques including the Istiqlal Mosque in Jakarta, the largest mosque in 
Southeast Asia. In its mission for commanding doing good deeds, Rodja TV has repeatedly 
held preaching sessions and organised Salafist conferences (dawra) at the mosque where a 
salafi speaker, the Medina University Professor, Abd al-Razzaq al-Badr, once explained the 
nature and the presence of God’s saints in Islam. This was an unusual theme for Salafists, 
but attractive to a wider public. Entitled "Loving the Guardians of God," the event was 
attended by about 130.000 Muslims from across Indonesia (Andirja, October 4, 2013). 
The sermon was effective and significant. First, Rodja TV acknowledged the existence 
of saints and accepted them, their mediation (tawassul) and their blessings (tabarruk) in 
worshipping God (al-Badr, 2016), despite its previous rejection of saints. Second, Salafist 
organizers deliberately held this event at the Istiqlal Mosque to muster public justification. 
By selecting the largest mosque in the region, Muslims perceived the Salafists in Rodja TV as 
a legitimate Islamic group much like the mainstream NU and Muhammadiyah. Thirdly, the 
event was broadcast on Rodja TV, which was clearly a Salafist effort to portray Rodja TV as 
an outstanding Islamic media that works for the interest of the public and relevant to the 
tradition of the Istiqlal Mosque.  
Rodja TV is a means for Salafi groups to enter the public space (Wahid, 2013: 102-
103). Full-time Islamic preaching both in recorded and live form, keeps them in close contact 
with their communities, in particular as Rodja TV can be retrieved via satellite and 
streamed-YouTube. For this group, this factor is certainly very important. As said, it uses 
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satellite television to reach people in rural areas, since people living far from urban centres 
can only access television by using a satellite dish (Tim Penulis, 2016). 
 
c) Market: An Effort to Market Islamic Communication 
During this research, the broadcasts of this television station appeared to consist solely of 
Islamic preaching with no advertising (before, during, or after the shows). The questions to 
be answered are thus, how is the station able to fund its programs? Are programs 
subsidized or sponsored? If so, by whom? The following will provide some answers. 
As an Islamic station, Rodja TV focuses on Islamic preaching but it cannot survive 
without solid and regular funding. To be able to run recorded, live activities (live broadcast), 
off-air and on-air activities, adequate funding is required. To meet its financial needs, Rodja 
TV is tied to the market, since they chose to be self-sufficient, relying mostly on internal 
financial support to avoid taking up loans from conventional banks and paying interests (a 
usury practice). Indeed, while Islamic economic banking is acceptable, the sunna rejects 
usury (Abdat, 2016; Tarmidzi, 2016). Rodja TV mainly produces programs it ultimately airs 
(‘sells’) to the audiences who are willing to donate funds in return. Because it is linked to the 
market, Rodja TV also delivers programs that meet its audience’s needs. To meet its market, 
Rodja TV needs to understand the community’s religious needs (Interview: Al-Sundawi, July 
24, 2016). According to its promotional booklet, Rodja TV’s existence is closely related to: 
first, society’s need for pure Islamic tenets sourced from the Qur’an and the Sunna amidst 
the rise of Islamic liberalism, globalism, and localism. Second, it is related to society’s need 
for spirituality and a form of practical Islam amidst the influence of modernism (Tim Penulis, 
2016). In the context of the first, the public looks up to Rodja TV and sees it as a purifier of 
Islamic teachings, while on the second, it is seen as the best substitute or solution to 
modern society. 
In fact, Rodja TV not only works for Islamic communication (preaching, realizing 
change, development, and exemplified society), but also seeks to attract the largest possible 
audience. At the very least, five elements in society are the objects of Rodja TV’s Islamic 
communication: Muslims in general; researchers and observers, students and activists of 
Islamic communication; foundations and Islamic social institutions; and everyone who 
believes in enjoying a good life in this world and in the hereafter (Tim Penulis, 2016). 
These five elements make up the sources of Rodja’s funding. Abu Fauzan (Interview: 
June 5, 2016), the head of Rodja TV’s media division, said: "Rodja TV can expand and is able 
to run its activities thanks to the financial support of its audience (jama‘a). The jama‘a 
thinks it is important to have knowledge of the sunna and does not hesitate to set aside 
money to sustain Rodja TV." Therefore, Rodja’s existence is closely related to these five 
elements in society. 
Rodja TV’s efforts to attract viewers by airing Islamic programs can be seen as a form 
of Islamic media economic activity (Zaied, 2008). The target is to obtain donations, charity 
funds, endowments, and alms as manifestations of amar ma‘ruf, from its viewers. Rodja TV 
does not use external advertisement as a source of funding, except for the sale of its own 
products, such as books, CD’s, USBs, and dish antennas (Interview: Haris, June, 24, 2016). 
This is clearly different from the practice found in non-religious television stations, where 
audience size increases ratings, which in turn increases potential advertising revenues. To 
get funding, Rodja TV promotes aspects of the Sunna and al-salaf al-salih as model 
examples for the community in all the messages of its programs. The clearest example is the 
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use of the tagline "Rodja TV, Spreading the Sunna Light" (OW, December 23, 2004) which 
portrays the station as a Sunna fighter and a true follower of al-salaf al-salih, implying that 
its broadcasts are worthy of being followed.  
In addition to the direct financial involvement of the viewers for amar ma‘ruf and 
muhsin commands, Rodja TV also owns its own business, Rodja Outlet which offers all the 
equipment needed to access Rodja TV’s broadcasts (OW, October 6, 2015). 
This outlet is one of Rodja TV sources of funding as mentioned in one of its 
brochures: "By purchasing a satellite dish through the official Rodja Outlet, you help the 
operations of Radio Rodja and Rodja TV. We say: “thank you and may Allah reward you with 
plenty of goods” to the men and women who trust us and who ordered and installed their 
satellite dish through Rodja Outlet" (OW, October 6, 2015). Similarly, viewers are told in Abu 
Zikri’s (June 20, 2016) social media status text: "Ladies and gentlemen, brothers and sisters 
in the Islamic faith. Realizing that part of Rodja TV’s financing comes from sales in outlets, 
we urge those who love the preaching for the Sunna to help by buying goods in our outlets." 
This implies that buying goods from Rodja is seen as a way of supporting da‘wa of the Sunna 
in that media. 
Rodja Outlet is highly instrumental for financing this station. Rodja Outlet has several 
branches in Indonesia, including in Java and Sumatra. According to Rodja TV’s advertising 
section (OW, October 6, 2015), Rodja Outlet opened branches country-wide in order for 
viewers to not only enjoy access to full Islamic information, but also to financially help the 
operationalization of Rodja TV (Interview: Fauzan, May 20, 2016).  
The same purpose is achieved through the display of photographs of Rodja TV 
preachers delivering speeches. It seems that these portraits emblazoned on the Outlet 
brochure have a sale value, and lure viewers to shop at Rodja outlets. 
Another interesting factor at play in Rodja TV is its relationship with economic 
activities in society. The Salafist complex around the station seems to greatly benefit from 
the station’s presence. According to Fauzan, crowds of traders have relocated to the station 
after its opening, where Sunna clothing such as pants, robes, and veils, among others, are 
sold. Around the complex, religious books may also be purchased, especially those related 
to the Salafi manhaj (the Salafist way), perfume, as well as zam-zam holy water from Mecca, 
and exotic food, such as, dates, olives and figs (Interview: Fauzan, July 15, 2016) imported 
from Mecca. Rodja TV indeed stands in the centre of market-like activities which clearly 
shows that its presence does not only encourage the umma (Islamic community) to live 
closer to the way of life of the Sunna, but also supports the development of economic 
activities among the community. 
 
d) State: Assisting the Government in Combatting Terrorism 
In performing its duties as an Islamic television station, Rodja TV is in a relationship with the 
state; at least, Rodja TV needs to comply with the broadcasting regulations set by the 
government (Maududi and Taslim, July, 27, 2016). In Indonesia, a television station has to 
help the government in building and educating the nation and to encourage media literacy. 
In addition, a television station must be a social controller, among others by keeping an eye 
on government activities. Rodja, as an actor in the Islamic press, seems to carry out this 
function in its pursuit of Islamic da‘wa. The Islamic press should at least be able to play a 
role in guaranteeing peace and tolerance (Bakti, 2015: 186-203), and to engage in peace 
journalism, which contributes to peace making, peace building and peace keeping. 
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At a time when the Indonesian people are engulfed by rampant terrorism and 
radicalism, Rodja TV has chosen to vehemently criticize religious extremism. Rodja TV stands 
behind the government. This is also consistent with the idea of prohibiting doing bad deeds 
(nahy munkar). This move is a radical change, however, as this station was once rumoured 
to be a centre for takfir (the traditional Salafist labelling of others as non-believers) and 
radicalists. In response to that rumour, Rodja TV has been trying to change its image by 
portraying itself as a da‘wa movement, as ahl sunna wa al-jama'a (the Sunni and 
community people), as opposed to jama'a takfir (people who judge others as non-
believers). Andirja (Interview: December 17, 2013), the prominent Rodja TV preacher we 
met above, said: "We have to act and show our opposition to and rejection of these takfir 
groups. Keeping silent about deviants (takfiri people, bombers, and terrorists) is very 
dangerous.”  
Since then, Rodja has been aggressively fighting terrorism and violence through its 
da‘wa programs of nahy munkar. Rodja producers air Islamic programs that aim to reject 
jihad —reframed as holy war against non-Muslims who attack Muslims and people who 
hinder the establishment of an Islamic state. Thus, in a very loud voice, the preacher, Jawas, 
asserted during a broadcast break at Rodja TV: "Rodja TV is convinced that actions that lead 
to creating anxiety for others, spilling blood, rebelling against rulers, committing suicide 
bombings, and killing innocent people, are not part of jihad and unlawful in Islam," (OW, 
January 14, 2016; see also Jawas, 2015). 
Similarly, Rodja TV recently broadcasted a religious sermon delivered by the Sunni 
scholar from Jordan, al-Halabi, under the title “Perbedaan antara Ahlusunna wal Jama‘a dan 
Jama‘a Takfir” (Differences between Sunni and the takfir people) in the mosque of the 
state-controlled Jakarta Islamic Center (JIC). In the sermon (July 16, 2017) he said "The 
strongest people against terrorism are those who hold on to the religion of God and cling to 
the truth because they are followers of the ahl al-sunna wa al jama‘a. Takfir people are 
those who are sunk in slander and who easily disbelieve others and engage in terror."  
In the latest years, the government closely monitors Wahhabism and suspects it of 
being politically radical. In his speech on YouTube (March 31, 2012) entitled “Dismantling 
Wahhabi Digression” Badrusalam indicated that Rodja actually does not agree with 
Wahhabism, even though it is Salafist in terms of its desire to purify Islamic culture from 
local and global influences. While Wahhabism is ideologically political (al-Wahhab, 2012), 
Rodja is ideologically cultural. 
Rodja TV’s anti-terrorism stance is further reinforced by the group’s proximity with 
law enforcement agencies. Badrusalam often delivers Islamic religious sessions in the 
Jakarta Police Station which are publically broadcasted to outside audiences. Research also 
shows that the administrator of the Polda Metro Jaya website is a Salafist. These factors 
certainly make it easier for Salafist preachers to deliver da‘wa sermons in the police station. 
According to Siti Tarawiyah’s research (2012, 1485-1500), Salafists also use government 
mosques for their da‘wa activities. Apparently, the legal apparatus itself does not see 
Salafist Rodja TV as a threat, as part of an extremist-terrorist movement or an instigator of 
potential suicide bombers, among others. In 2013, Radio Rodja also aired live programs 
from the police station followed by public discussions but these radio and TV broadcasts 
were later removed from the official police website following protests by several members 
of the NU, which accommodates the local traditions Rodja TV rejects. This does not, 
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however, mean that the police banned Rodja TV and Rodja Radio in the police station, as 
many policemen still faithfully watch Rodja TV programs (Karuk, January 30, 2014). 
The intimacy between Rodja TV and the police station might translate into either 
protection or surveillance depending on the level of trust involved. If Rodja TV were to be 
considered an Islamic group that initiates acts of terrorism and radicalism, then these police 
officers would certainly be the first to rebuke or capture its managers and teachers, and 
even close the station down. On the reverse, as observed (June 12, 2017 at Rodja TV), 
policemen attend the Friday prayer at the Al-Barkah Mosque and thus, Rodja TV may have 
influenced policemen and they might hesitate to sanction or close the station as the case 
may be. According to its leaders, as a da‘wa Salafist group, Rodja TV is neither engaged in 
resisting the state nor does it condone the use of violence (Badrussalam, August 28, 2015). 
Proximity with the police was also underlined by another preacher, Andirja 
(September 23, 2014), in a pengajian (religious discussion) held in the Darul Ilmi PTIK (Police 
Science College) Mosque in Kebayoran in South Jakarta. Andirja addressed the theme: ‘The 
attitude of a Muslim when Facing ISIS.’ He said, “Khawarij (a radical theology that emerged 
in the seventh century) was the first in Islam to use the notion of takfir (easily discrediting 
other Muslims) and easily killing people they see as outsiders.” A theology professor of the 
State Islamic University in Jakarta, Harun Nasution (2013) thought that, although the 
Khawarij School of theology is marginal in Islam, and rejected by mainstream Muslims, it is 
still powerful and adopts a radical position in fighting what they define as tyranny: 
authoritarianism, injustice, corruption, among others. 
Thus, Rodja TV portrays itself as an institution that belongs to mainstream Sunni 
Islam and the state. Its leaders say that their Islamic TV station does not threaten the 
unitary state of Indonesia (NKRI). Rodja TV is a traditionalist Salafi vehicle that not only does 
not plan to criticize the government but even refuses to resist the legitimate government 
(contrary to ISIS’s position). Roy and Putra said, “Indeed Allah Almighty obliges us to obey 
our leaders (for this is amar ma’ruf and muhsin); Muslims are not allowed to oppose the 
government” (March 15, 2016). In fact, this is prohibited, and the prohibition of doing bad 
deeds (nahy munkar) is considered a Salafist way.  
On a different issue, in April 2017, the elections for a new Jakarta governor gave rise 
to heated debates and demonstrations over the possibility of Muslims being led by a non-
Muslim leader. Badrusalam said that ulamas (Muslim scholars) agreed that it was unlawful 
for non-Muslims to govern Muslims (Badrusalam, October 14, 2016). While he did not 
elaborate further, Rodja TV was among the few religious groups that did not urge people to 
join the demonstrations (Taslim, November 6, 2016) against this Non-Muslim leader. Ali 
Putra (November 25, 2016) also said, “the Qur’an should not be defended through 
demonstrations.” Al-Badr added, “All people and institutions are responsible for national 
stability and security. Thus, people should keep away from slander and chaos, which lead to 
destruction and doing bad deeds (munkar)” (February 26, 2017). 
 
CONCLUSION 
Both as a radio and as a television station, Rodja is a civil society organization which has been 
following the Islamic communication model for a civil society discourse.  
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Private Sphere 
Initially, Rodja TV started broadcasting programs (at the information or tabligh level) related to 
the private sphere through the self-realization of its identity. First its founders promoted the 
importance that each individual has to be a good, responsible Muslim (muhsin), not only in this 
world but also in the hereafter.  
The organization eventually emphasised social change (taghyir) and took a second 
approach to Islamic communication for the civil society discourse by establishing a radio (Radio 
Rodja) and a television (Rodja TV) station. Each of their founders (all male) had his own 
responsibility. Business persons, who are also informal community leaders, supported the initial 
establishment by donating land for a mosque and after that for the foundation and the radio and 
television stations. Other leaders are preachers who invite scholars from the Middle-East while 
members of the young generations are responsible for the stations’ technical development and 
maintenance.  
These early activists were proactively responsible for the development of the association 
and its radio and television programs for community development (takwin al-umma) in its 
discourse for civil society. Then, in order to expand the exemplified community (salaf al-salih or 
khariyyat al-umma), Rodja has been using an outward-looking approach (ukhrijat li al-nas) to 
reach its audiences through Rodja TV’s broadcasting. Peace Journalism (Bakti, 2015) seems at 
work here. 
 
Market Sphere 
Individuals and their families are given information about the importance of amar ma‘ruf 
(commanding good) and amal shalih (good deeds), donations, charities, endowments, and 
almsgiving, including buying equipment to access Islamic broadcast programs. In the civil society 
market sphere, these elements have become Rodja’s main source of income.  
Rodja TV also directly approaches business people as it broadcasts no commercial 
programs and advertisement, which is a challenge for the civil society market. Instead, the station 
relies on the contribution of the Muslims by optimizing its outlets where customized television 
equipment and services are sold. Without advertisements, indeed, Rodja TV has managed to solve 
the financial problems religious media usually face in Indonesia. 
 
Public Sphere 
In the public sphere of civil society, Rodja TV promotes the Sunna and Salafi ideas by adopting the 
same approach as the main Muslim organizations, Muhammadiyah and NU, who are also active 
audiences of Radio Rodja and Rodja TV programs. Although NU members were initially 
uncomfortable with the programs, they were eventually persuaded to adhere to Rodja’s ideas. On 
the other hand, Rodja TV has also shifted its strategy from opposing belief in saints, tawassul 
(mediation to worship God), and tabarruk (praying for God’s blessing though this mediation) to 
accepting it and saying that they are also important elements in community development.  
 
State Sphere 
Links with the government have also been established for legal and security purposes. In addition 
to the need to have government-issued operating licences, some Rodja TV members are police 
officers, as Rodja TV is located behind the police station and some television programs have been 
aired directly from the police station. This also contributes to Rodja TV’s security, stability, and the 
sustainability of its programs. A shift is being observed from criticising the government for not 
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putting Islamic values in practice to accommodating the government; this reflects a softening of 
the discourse of this brand of Salafism and of its new approach to da‘wa. This mutual strategic 
adaptation could pave the way for the realisation of true civil society at the national level.  
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